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I. INTRODUCTION
INCE SEPTEMBER 11, "the phrase 'Flying While Arab' has
begun to seep into the national dialogue, an echo of the
long-standing African American complaint of being stopped
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merely for 'Driving While Black."" Even prior to the destruc-
tion of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon,
various publications and organizations expressed concern about
possible disparate treatment of Arab Americans and Arabs as a
result of racial profiling 2 in airport security procedures man-
dated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) .3 This con-
cern was bolstered by complaints filed by Arab Americans and
Arabs who felt they were singled out by these procedures.4 How-
ever, general public awareness of possible racial profiling of
Arabs by the airline industry was low. When racial profiling was
in the news, it was generally in the context of alleged disparate
treatment of African Americans and Hispanic Americans by law
enforcement agencies, and to a lesser degree, by the United
States Customs Service. Any intimation of racial profiling in
these contexts, or any context, was generally viewed as a bad
thing. Post September 11, extensive media coverage of the justi-
fiable public concern for airline safety and the treatment of
some Arabs as they resumed flying has changed this perception.5
I Ken Ellingwood & Nicholas Riccardi, Racial Profiling - Arab Americans Endur-
ing Hard Stares of Other Fliers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al. "Driving while
black" is the phrase used to describe the use of pretextual traffic stops by the
police that disproportionately target black males. See, e.g., David A. Harris, The
Stories, The Statistics, and The Law: Why 'Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (1999).
2 For purposes of this paper, racial profiling is defined as the use of race or
ethnicity, in combination with other factors or solely, or the use of a combination
of factors that has a disparate impact on individuals of a given race or ethnicity to
single out an individual. This definition seems to fit the circumstances that have
given rise to complaints in both the "Driving While Black" and "Flying While
Arab" contexts.
3 See, e.g., Michael J. AuBuchon, Choosing How Safe Is Enough: Increased Antiter-
rorist Federal Activity and Its Effect on the General Public and the Airport/Airline Industry,
64J. AIR L. & COM. 891, 903-06 (1999); Press Release, American Civil Liberties
Union, Profiling of Fliers Raises Racial Issue (Sept. 26, 1997), available at http://
www.aclu.org/news (last visited Oct. 30, 2002); Neil A. Lewis, Arab-Americans Pro-
test 'Profiling' at Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A12; Donna Abu-Nasr, Arab
and Muslim Americans Say Profiling Discriminates Against Them, Assoc. PREss, July
17, 1997, available at 1997 WL 4875401; Civil Rights Issues Facing Arab Americans in
Michigan, Michigan Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
May 16, 2001, available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/misac2/main.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Civil Rights Issues]; Donna Smith, Passenger Profil-
ing: A Greater Terror Than Terrorism Itself?., 32J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167 (1998).
4 See, e.g., 1998-2000 Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Ameri-
cans 23-28 (Hussein Ibish ed., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
2001) [hereinafter 1998-2000 Report].
5 See, e.g., Ellingwood & Riccardi, supra note 1; Stuart Taylor Jr., The Case for
Using Racial Profiling at Airports, NAT'L J., Sept. 22, 2001, available at http://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor200l-09-25.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002);
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Racial profiling of Arabs, especially in the context of air travel
security, is a hot topic. And, perhaps, in a post-September 11
America, the view of racial profiling as an anathema has
changed, at least in the limited context of airline safety.6
This Comment examines the issue of racial and ethnic profil-
ing of Arabs and Muslims in the context of air travel security. In
general, it explores the idea that before the terrorist attacks on
September 11, it was difficult to prove that racial profiling was a
factor in airline security procedures. Post-September 11, the le-
gal and public climate makes the situation much more difficult.
For the foreseeable future, the viable legal options available to
Arab Americans and Arabs are limited even if airline security
procedures do have a disparate impact on them. Part II looks at
how racial profiling concerns were handled prior to September
11, particularly noting that despite a lot of rhetoric and numer-
ous complaints, little substantive change was made in airport se-
curity procedures and, most notably, the issue has not been
litigated. Part III addresses the very real escalation in racial pro-
filing concerns post-September 11, surveying the public policy
and legal justifications for allowing racial profiling in the con-
text of airline security. Part III also examines the implications of
the increased security procedures mandated by the FAA and the
recently passed Aviation and Transportation Security Act.7
John Stossel, Rethinking Racial Profiling - How the Attacks Have Changed Views,
ABCNEWS.COM, Oct. 4, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/
2020_011002_racialprofiling-stossel.html; Edmund Sanders, Attacks Prompt Calls
for More Passenger Profiling, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at Al; Airlines, Passengers
Confront Racial Profiling, CNN.coM, Oct. 3, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
TRAVEL/NEWS/ 10/03/rec.airlines.profiling/index.html [hereinafter CNN Re-
port]; Catherine Donaldson Evans, Terror Probe Changes Face of Racial Profiling De-
bate, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 1, 2001, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,35521,00.html; Frank J. Murray, Profiling by Airlines Gets Public Support,
WASi. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at Al.
6 See, e.g., Oralander Brand-Williams, et.al., Court Sidesteps Racial Profiling, DE-
TROIT NEWS, Oct. 2, 2001, available at http://www.detnews.com/2001/nation/
0110/02/aO-308482.htm.
7 Aviation & Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-071, 115 Stat. 597
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). This Act, among other
things, takes airport security screening out of the hands of the airlines. 49
U.S.C.S. § 44935 (2002).
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II. PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 - PASSENGER PROFILING
OR RACIAL PROFILING?
"Discriminatory application of airline security procedures
against Arab Americans, American Muslims-or any other
group-is unacceptable in a free society."'
Prior to September 11, the major focus of complaints regard-
ing potential racial profiling in air travel security procedures was
on the use of profiles to identify potential terrorists. The es-
sence of these complaints and concerns was that passengers of
Arab descent were singled out for enhanced security procedures
far more often than passengers of other races. So, an initial
question comes to mind: Is the use of profiles to screen passen-
gers merely a non-discriminatory security procedure or is it dis-
guised racial profiling? There is no clear answer to this
question. The issue has never been litigated. Is this because the
problem is real, but the legal environment makes it clear that
winning a discrimination suit will be extremely difficult, or is
there another explanation?
A. PASSENGER PROFILING OR RACIAL PROFILING?
Passenger profiling was first introduced into airline security
procedures in the late 1960s as a part of security measures man-
dated by the FAA in response to increasing hijackings of passen-
ger aircraft.9' The theory was that potential hijackers could be
identified by a list of personal attributes, i.e. a "profile" that cu-
mulatively suggests a person is likely to be a terrorist.' If a per-
son fit the "profile," his or her carry-on luggage was subjected to
x-ray or other search procedures." This practice was discontin-
ued in 1972 because it was deemed ineffective. 12 Instead, secur-
Prepared Remarks by U.S. Transportation Secretary Rodney E. Slater White
House Briefing for 8th Annual Meeting of Muslim-American Council Washing-
ton, D.C., May 7, 1999, available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1999/5799sp.htm
[hereinafter Slater Remarks].
9 Jamie L. Rhee, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the Face
of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 847, 852 (2000).
Id.
Id.
12 Gregory T. Nojeim, Aviation Security Profiling and Passengers' Civil Liberties, 13-
SUM AIR & SPACE L. 3, 6 (1998). See aLso Smith, supra note 3, at 171. "In fact, in
1972, the last year airport security personnel used profiles in this country, there
were 28 hijackings." Id.
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ity checkpoints were established at airports and all carry-on
luggage was x-rayed.13
Although subjecting all passengers to the security checkpoints
and the attendant x-ray of carry-on luggage had the desired ef-
fect of virtually eliminating hijackings," a new problem arose,
the planting of bombs on passenger airplanes by terrorists. Af-
ter the explosion of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, amid calls
for increased safety procedures, the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security was established. 5 Among their
recommendations was a proposal for the reintroduction of pas-
senger profiling, this time in automated form.16 The FAA went
to work developing an automated system and many airlines be-
gan doing manual profiling while awaiting the automated
system. 17
Since 1998, the airline industry has been using an automated
passenger profiling system, Computer Assisted Passenger
Screening (CAPS), developed by the FAA. 8 Prior to boarding a
plane, data is collected on all passengers and used to make a
determination as to whether any passenger poses a potential se-
curity risk. 19 If selected by CAPS, the passenger is "subjected to
heightened security procedures. 2 1' CAPS also randomly selects
passengers to be subjected to these additional security
procedures.2'
When CAPS was introduced, the FAA's stated intent was that
the additional security procedures would apply only to selectees'
checked luggage, most likely bag matching or some sort of tech-
nological examination for explosives.22 However, as many of
13 Nojeim, supra note 12, at 6.
14 Id.
15 Smith, supra note 3, at 173.
16 Id. at 174. There is some irony in the fact that the explosion that caused the
reintroduction of the controversial passenger profiling was later found to have
likely been caused by a defective fuel tank design, not a terrorist attack. Rhee,
supra note 9, at 857.
17 Nojeim, supra note 12, at 4.
1s Civil Rights Issues, supra note 3. This system is currently also referred to as
the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). Press Release,
DOT, DOT Investigates Passenger Security Screening's Impact on Minorities
(June 4, 2001) [hereinafter DOT Press Release].
'.9 Civil Rights Issues, supra note 3.
20 Id.
21 DOT Press Release, supra note 18.
22 Report by the Department of Justice to the Department of Transportation
on the Civil Rights Review of the Proposed Automated Passenger Screening Sys-
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those who spoke against CAPS feared,2" these procedures re-
portedly went far beyond this stated intent. Some selectees had
their luggage manually searched, sometimes to the point of
completely unpacking the bags and sometimes in front of other
passengers. 24 They were asked questions by ticket agents and
other security personnel that go far beyond those asked of other
passengers.25 In some reported cases, these searches and ques-
tions took so long that selectees missed flights.26 When airline
officials and employees were asked why certain individuals were
singled out, national origin was implicated in the response. 27
tern, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Oct. 1, 1997, available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
misac2/app.htm [hereinafter DOJ Report]. This report explicitly stated that:
Depending on the destination of the passenger (domestic or for-
eign) and the availability of advanced technology at particular air-
ports, the additional security measure applied to selectees typically
will involve one of the following: bag matching (the requirement
that checked luggage be flown only if it is determined that the pas-
senger who checked the luggage has boarded the airplane); exami-
nation by a certified explosive detection system (EDS); or
examination using other advanced technology (such as an explo-
sive detection device or a trace detector).
Id.
23 See, e.g., Nojeim, supra note 12, at 5. "Other security measures [that could be
applied] include: asking passengers personal questions about their travel; having
their luggage sniffed by trained dogs; removing the contents of ... luggage and
examining each item in front of other passengers' escorting the passenger
through the airport 'for security reasons' in full view of other passengers" etc. Id.
24 1998-2000 Report, supra note 4, at 24-8. An elderly Arab-American couple
was detained by a Delta Airlines agent at the Brussels International Airport. Id. at
27. Their luggage was unpacked and inspected manually. Id. At the Barran-
quilla Airport in Colombia, an American permanent resident of Saudi origin was
questioned by an American Airlines agent. Id. at 25. After consulting with his
supervisor, the agent told him that his luggage would be inspected. Id. A two-
hour manual search of his luggage was conducted in full view of other passen-
gers. Id.
25 Id. at 24-8. At the Frankfurt International Airport in Germany, an Arab
American was questioned by a United Airlines security officer. Id. at 28. He was
asked questions such as "whom he saw in Egypt, who his relatives are in Egypt, on
which airline he flew to Egypt, and how long he lived in the United States." Id.
d; i. at 24-8. At the Dulles International Airport in Virginia, an Arab man
travelling to Aruba for a medical conference had his passport and plane ticket
taken by an American Airlines representative. Id. at 25. He was delayed so long
that he missed his flight and the first day of his medical conference. Id.
27 Id. at 24-8. An Arab man detained at Dulles International Airport in Vir-
ginia was told by an American Airlines supervisor that "the reason for this inci-
dent was his national origin." Id. at 25. At Charlotte Airport in North Carolina, a
Syrian woman returning home after visiting her family in the United States was
selected by a British Airways agent to have her luggage searched. Id. at 25. A
British Airways manager said she was selected because she was Syrian. Id.
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The criteria used by CAPS to select passenger are confiden-
tial28 and government officials have staunchly maintained that
they "are not based on the race, ethnicity, religion or gender of
passengers. 29 In 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
reviewed the selection criteria and determined that they did not
"discriminate unlawfully against passengers.'0' Nor did the se-
lection criteria include passenger traits such as names or mode
of dress that might be directly associated with race, ethnicity, or
religion.31 The bottom line opinion of the DOJ was that CAPS
would not have a "disparate impact on any group of
passengers. 32
However, Arab advocacy groups maintain that the use of pas-
senger profiling does disparately target Arabs and Arab Ameri-
cans. 3 According to the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee (ADC),'" twenty-four percent of the complaints re-
ceived annually by the ADC legal staff are about airline profil-
ing. 5 The ADC position is that "profiling, even under the best
circumstances, provides an opportunity for the prejudices and
stereotypes held by law enforcement and other officials to be
expressed through discriminatory application of profiles. At
worst, they are simply a recipe for bigoted behavior." 6
28 Abu-Nasr, supra note 3. Although the criteria are supposed to be secret,
some of them have been revealed. See, e.g., Nojeim, supra note 12, at 5. The
criteria include such information as whether the ticket was purchased with cash
or a credit card; whether the ticket was purchased immediately before departure
or in advance; who the passenger is traveling with; whether the passenger is rent-
ing a car at the flight destination; where the flight originates and its ultimate
destination; the passenger's ultimate destination; and whether the flight is round
trip or one-way. Id.
29 See, e.g., DOT Press Release, supra note 18; Kathleen Koch, Passenger Profiling
Beefed Up at Airports, CNN.coM, Nov. 8, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
TRAVEL/NEWS/ 1/08/rec.passenger.profiling/index.html (stating that U.S.
Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta insists that CAPS does not use race).
3o Id.; see also DOJ Report, supra note 22.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., 1998-2000 Report, supra note 4; Abu-Nasr, supra note 3; Nojeim, supra
note 12.
34 The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) is a civil rights
organization founded in 1980 by former U.S. SenatorJames G. Abourezk. 1998-
2000 Report, supra note 4, at 3. Its purpose is to defend the rights of and promote
the heritage of Arab Americans. Id. It is "the largest Arab-American grass roots
organization in the United States." Id.
35 Id. at 24.
36 Id. As one ADC spokesperson succinctly stated: "Profiling has become just a
fancy word for racism or stereotyping." Keith L. Alexander, Profiling of Fliers
Raises Racial Issue, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 1997, at IA.
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B. IF RACIAL PROFILING IN AIRLINE SECURITY Is So PREVALENT,
WHY HASN'T IT BEEN LITIGATED?
Despite all the concern expressed and all the complaints that
have been logged, the issue of racial profiling of Arabs in the
context of airline security generated little litigation prior to Sep-
tember 11. Only two suits have been filed and neither created
any definitive case law. 37 In 1991, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) sued Pan Am World Airways for allegedly sub-
jecting passengers of Middle Eastern descent to increased secur-
ity measures "based on their race and national origin."3 Pan
Am denied the allegations and the suit went away when Pan Am
became insolvent. 9 In 1997, Hassan Abbass, a U.S. citizen of
Arabic descent, filed suit against U.S. Airways for alleged "dis-
criminatory security screening."40 Mr. Abbass' suit was settled
out of court.4'
Perhaps the reason for this dearth of litigation is that, as is
amply demonstrated in related case law, the legal climate is not
conducive to victory. The legal debate over CAPS suggested that
its use and the attendant security procedures violate certain con-
stitutional rights of the selectees, including the Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment provisions for equal protection.
Strong doubt was expressed that these procedures would find
support in the courts. However, all the arguments presented
37 This conclusion is based on an extensive search of legal literature on
WestLaw and of public information available on the Internet.
38 Nojeim, supra note 12, at 7.
39 Id.
40 Id. See also Michael Higgins, Looking The Part, 83-NOV A.B.A. J. 48 (1997).
On May 24, 1997, before boarding their flight to St. Martin, Mr. Abbass and his
wife were selected from a line of approximately 200 passengers for extra security
measures. They were walked through metal detectors, their luggage was
searched, and their bags had florescent-green tags saying "Positive I.D." attached
to them. Id. They were told by airline workers that they were selected because
"there are these guidelines and you meet the guidelines." Id. The Abbasses filed
a $4 million civil rights suit against U.S. Airways saying they were selected because
Mr. Abbass is Arab-American. Id.
41 Nojeim, supra note 12, at 7.
42 See, e.g., Rhee, supra note 9, at 860-63 (arguing that it was "unlikely that the
courts would approve of CAPS or the use of profiling, even though the [adminis-
trative search] doctrine was developed partly for airline searches"); Nojeim, supra
note 12 (arguing that passenger profiling and the associated searches violate civil
liberties); Smith, supra note 3, at 172-92 (outlining various constitutional issues
surrounding the use of passenger profiling). A third constitutional theory, based
on discriminatory violation of the right to travel, might also be used but is beyond
the scope of this paper. See Rhee, supra note 9, at 860-61; Heather E. Reser,
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seem to ignore the precedents set in the "driving while black"
and other related case law.43 The courts have established that
such security procedures, although administered by private air-
line employees, are state actions and the employees are state ac-
tors because "private airline employees are no different than
public officials when conducting a search."44 In essence, the ac-
tions of the private airline employees are no different that those
of a policeman or a customs official or other government em-
ployees and their actions will likely be judged in court by the
same standards.
1. Unreasonable Search and the Fourth Amendment
One immediately obvious way to state a claim that an airline
security search was motivated by race is to assert a Fourth
Amendment claim that the search was unreasonable.45 Airline
passengers do have a privacy interest in their luggage and per-
sonal possessions that is covered by the Fourth Amendment.46
However, the claimant immediately hits two barriers that seem
to be insurmountable - the administrative search doctrine and
the unanimous Supreme Court ruling in Whren v. United States.47
The courts have evolved an administrative search doctrine
that permits certain searches, such as those conducted in the
interests of air travel security, without triggering Fourth Amend-
ment protection.4" This doctrine provides for:
Airline Terrorism: The Effect of Tightened Security on the Right to Travel, 63 J. AIR L. &
COM. 819 (1998).
43 In this paper, "driving while black" is used as shorthand for any law enforce-
ment situation outside the airport security context in which racial profiling is
deemed to be an issue. The arguments also ignore the difficulty claimants have
merely getting their claims heard by the court. The plaintiff must first establish
standing and this has proved to be difficult, especially where equitable relief in
the form of an injunction is sought. Sean P. Trende, Wiy Modest Proposals Offer the
Best Solution for Combating Racial Profiling, 50 DUKE L.J. 331, 343. The Supreme
Court set the standard for establishing standing in such cases in City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The Lyons court held that the likelihood of the
plaintiff suffering another injury was too speculative to meet the standing re-
quirement. Id. at 108. This holding has been used to dismiss several racial profil-
ing cases seeking injunctive relief. For a more in-depth discussion of this ruling
and other standing issues in racial profiling cases, see Trende, supra, at 342-50.
44 Rhee, supra note 9, at 863. See also Smith, supra note 3 at 177-78.
45 Trende, supra note 43, at 350.
46 Rhee, supra note 9, at 861.
47 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
48 Rhee, supra note 9, at 861. "[S]earches conducted as part of a general
regulatory scheme, done in furtherance of administrative goals rather than to
secure evidence of a crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment
2002] 1383
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Nonconsensual warrantless searches without probable cause or
individualized suspicion ... when conducted pursuant to a regu-
latory program calculated to further a manifestly important gov-
ernmental interest under circumstances where the program is
reasonably tailored to further the governmental interest and
where the intrusion on personal privacy or security is relatively
slight in comparison to the interest served by the program.49
The courts have recognized a compelling reason for airline
security searches.50 Such searches are part of a "regulatory
scheme to keep dangerous people and items off of aircraft." 5'
The courts view this as a high priority administrative function
that justifies some level of intrusive behavior.5 2 They have con-
sistently found that the searches performed at the security
checkpoints in airports are "reasonably tailored" and that a suffi-
cient balance between the "intrusion on personal privacy" and
the "interest served by the program" has been maintained.53
Although the cases of record have dealt only with searches at
security checkpoints, it is safe to assume that the courts would
be quick to apply the same rationale to searches conducted as
the result of a selection by CAPS. "As long as the potential pas-
senger has submitted to the airport security process and the se-
curity personnel conduct a physical search . . . that is no more
intrusive than necessary to achieve the objective of air safety,
such search must be viewed as a reasonable part of airport secur-
ity procedures."54
Even if a claimant were able to find a way to defeat the appli-
cations of the administrative search doctrine, the decision in
Whren 5 5 effectively blocks any claim that the search was unrea-
sonable because it was motivated by race.56 Justice Scalia stated
without a particularized showing of probable cause." Id. (quoting United States
v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998)).
41, People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Colo. 1991).
-54) Rhee, supra note 9, at 864.
51 Rhee, supra note 9, at 864.
52 Rhee, supra note 9, at 864.
53 See, e.g., Rhee, supra note 9, at 864; United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency,
873 F.2d 1240, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509,
513 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir. 1973).
54 People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo. 1991).
55 In this case, the petitioners, who were black, contended that police officers
might use the race of a vehicle's occupants to decide which vehicle to stop.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). They contended that the
Fourth Amendment test applied to traffic stops should be whether a reasonable
police officer would have made the stop for the reason given. Id.
56 Trende, supra note 43, at 350.
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that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally dis-
criminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause,
not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.
5 7
2. Disparate Impact and Equal Protection
Given Justice Scalia's words above, any litigation over an air-
port search allegedly motivated by race will likely be relegated to
an Equal Protection claim. Here again, a claimant is faced with
an uphill battle because the legal climate surrounding such
claims makes it difficult to prevail.58
According to the Equal Protection Clause, the government is
not permitted to "make or enforce any law which shall .. deny
to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
Laws. ''59 Race is one of the suspect classifications that will trig-
ger analysis under this clause."' Under an Equal Protection
analysis, racial discrimination can be found in the words of the
law or in the effect of the law.6 The Supreme Court has held
that if a law has "a discriminatory effect on persons belonging to
a suspect classification, the law is subject to strict scrutiny and
can be upheld only if it is closely tailored to fulfill a compelling
governmental purpose."62
In extending the administrative search doctrine to air line se-
curity searches, the courts have established that ensuring secur-
ity in air travel is a sufficiently "compelling governmental
purpose."6 Even if they had not, few could rationally argue that
keeping a terrorist from blowing up a plane full of innocent
57 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. Justice Scalia added that the Supreme Court is "un-
willing to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motiva-
tions of individual officers." Id.
58 Trende, supra note 43, at 350.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
- Rhee, supra note 9, at 862 (citing Hernandez v. Tex., 347 U.S. 475, 482
(1954)).
61 Rhee, supra note 9, at 862 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373
(1886) and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613. 625 (1982)). "Though the law itself be
fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered
by public authority with . . . an unequal hand .... to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,... the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution." Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-
74.
62 Rhee, supra note 9, at 863 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
63 See, e.g., People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo. 1991); United States v.
$124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
138520021
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people is not a compelling purpose. As discussed above in the
Fourth Amendment analysis, the courts are highly likely to find
CAPS and the associated security procedures to be sufficiently
"tailored." There is nothing in the language of the FAA regula-
tions that explicitly details the use of race as a criteria, so the
claimant is left with the difficult problem of showing some type
of disparate impact of the law that is attributable to race. And,
even if disparate impact can be shown, the claimant must prove
that the disparate impact is the result of racial animus to
prevail.64
The FAA has consistently maintained that race is not one of
the criteria used by CAPS in the selection process.65 Even if it
were, it is unlikely that the inclusion of race as a factor in a pas-
senger profile would necessarily lead to finding of impermissible
discrimination. In the "driving while black" jurisprudence,
courts have found that race may be included as a factor as long
as it is not the only factor.6" In two cases, United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerti,7 and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,68 the Supreme
Court found that race may be considered in selecting who to
stop at border checkpoints. 69 In United States v. Weaver,7° the
court acknowledged that race was a factor in the decision to stop
and search a young black male but did not find this use of race
Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893,
908-12 (9th Cir. 1973).
64 Trende, supra note 43, at 350-51 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
242 (1976)). "[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose,
is unconstitutional Solely [sic] because it has a racially disproportionate impact."
Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
65 See, e.g., DOT Press Release, supra note 18; Koch, supra note 29.
66 Trende, supra note 43, at 357. Not all courts accept the use of race in a
profile but the weight of authority is supportive. Id. For cases that disfavor the
use of race, see City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 NW.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990);
Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Barber,
823 P.2d. 1068 (Wash. 1992).
67 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
68 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
69 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court stated that "even if it be assumed that such re-
ferrals [to the secondary checkpoint] are made largely on the basis of apparent
Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation." Martinez-Fuere, 428
U.S. at 564 n.17. In Brignoni-Ponce, the court found that "[t]he likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor." Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
70 United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992).
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violated his constitutional rights. 71 And in United States v. Cole-
man,72 the court stated explicitly that "ethnic background and,
similarly, race are not features which can alone justify an investi-
gative stop, they are one factor which may be taken into ac-
count, together with other pertinent circumstances. '7'  These
findings are substantially duplicated in a number of other juris-
dictions.7 ' Given that the CAPS profiles are known to include
other factors 75 that are arguably relevant to determining
whether a passenger is a potential terrorist, the inclusion of race
would not seem to create an Equal Protection violation.
Without the "smoking gun" of race, the claimant is left with
proving some type of disparate impact in the administration of
the law that is motivated by intentional discrimination. The
courts seem to have set a very high standard for a showing of
disparate impact76 and the defense has a very strong counter ar-
gument. As previously mentioned, the initial DOJ study of the
CAPS profile criteria found that there was no disparate impact
on Arabs77 and other studies have apparently corroborated this
finding.7
8
71 Id. at 394. The DEA agent who stopped Weaver admitted that he did so
because he was a poorly dressed young black male who was "walking rapidly, al-
most running down the concourse." Id. at 392. The court found that using race
was a permissible factor in view of his behavior and the fact that the agent knew
that black Los Angeles gangs were bringing cocaine into the area. Id.
72 United States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
73 Id. at 439 n.7. The DEA agent testified that he stopped Coleman at the
airport because he was coming from Los Angeles, he appeared to have no lug-
gage, and he was black. Id. at 435.
74 SeeTrende, supra note 43, at 356; United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Richard, 535 F.2d 246 (3d. Cir. 1976); United States v. Stone, 73 F. Supp.
2d 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425 (Ariz. 1975); State v. Barber,
823 P.2d 1068 (Wash. 1992).
75 Nojeim, supra note 12, at 5.
76 See, e.g., Trende, supra note 43, at 350-54; John Gibeaut, Marked for Humilia-
tion, 13-FEB NBA NAT'L B.A. MAG. 20, 21 (1999); Elisabeth R. Calcaterra & Nata-
lie G. Mitchell, Note, Subtracting Race From The "Reasonable Calculus": An End to
Racial Profiling? United States v. Montero-Comargo, 208 F3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) Cert.
Denied Sub Nom, 6 Micii. J. RACE & L. 339, 346-47 (2001).
77 DOJ Report, supra note 22.
78 Slater Remarks, supra note 8. These results are not particularly surprising as
CAPS reportedly selects passengers at random as well. DOT Press Release, supra
note 18. In 2000, the Department of Transportation began another study to de-
termine if CAPS was disproportionately selecting Arabs and Muslims for addi-
tional scrutiny. 1998-2000 Report, supra note 4, at 23-24; see also DOT Press
Release, supra note 18 (announcing the first passenger survey of the study.) The
results of this study have not been published to date.
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To establish a claim of disparate impact, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that similarly situated individuals of a different race
were not treated the same way.7" In essence, an Arab selectee
must show that similarly situated non-Arab passengers could
have been selected but were not. Such a showing generally de-
pends on the availability of statistics to support the allegation.8 0
Such statistics are difficult to obtain since there is likely no re-
cord of instances in which a passenger could have been selected
but was not. And to get access to any records, the plaintiff has to
cross a huge discovery barrier."' The Supreme Court has held
that discovery will not be allowed unless the plaintiff can show
that similarly situated individuals were treated differently - a
true Catch-22.82
Even if statistical evidence is available, it is likely not enough
to make the requisite showing of intentional discrimination."
Even fairly compelling statistics that CAPS selected Arabs in sig-
nificant percentage over passengers of other races would proba-
bly not survive a summary judgment motion. 4 In McClesky v.
Kemp, the Supreme Court found that a statistical study showing a
disparate application of the death sentence based on the defen-
dant's race was not sufficient to show purposeful discrimina-
tion. 5  More recently, in United States v. Armstrong,6 the
Supreme Court found a study showing that all persons prose-
cuted for crack offenses were black was insufficient to demon-
79 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
8) Gibeaut, supra note 76, at 21 (citing Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F.
Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1998) as one example).
81, Calcaterra & Mitchell, supra note 76, at 346.
82 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 552. The plaintiff might try to use anecdotal evidence
such as interviews with other passengers to make such a showing but courts have
not been favorable to that approach. See Trende, supra note 43, at 352 (citing
Brown v. Ellendale Police Dept., No. 97-54-SLR, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5053 (D.
Del. Mar. 31, 1999)). In Brown, the court found that the plaintiffs anecdotal
evidence of other racially motivated traffic stops was not sufficient to show a dis-
parate impact on black drivers and granted summaryjudgment to the defendant.
Brown, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *9.
83 Calcaterra & Mitchell, supra note 76, at 347; Trende, supra note 43, at 351-
54.
84 Trende, supra note 43, at 352-353 (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456 and Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
85 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279. "At most, the ... study indicates a discrepancy
that appears to correlate with race ... [but it] does not demonstrate a constitu-
tionally significant risk of racial bias." Id. at 312-313; see Calcaterra & Mitchell,
supra note 76, at 347.
86 Armstrong, U.S. 517 U.S. at 456.
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strate a disparate impact.87 Even expert testimony interpreting a
series of videotapes of police stops has been deemed inade-
quate." Indeed, very few cases exist where statistical evidence
was found to be sufficient. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,89 the plaintiff
presented evidence that all Chinese petitioners were denied the
right to operate their home businesses while other non-Chinese
petitioners were given permission. The Supreme Court found
this to be adequate to demonstrate a disparate impact with in-
tentional discrimination."' However, this holding likely came
about because the government had no rationale other than race
for closing down the Chinese-owned businesses.9
3. The Issue That Wasn't?
Alternatively, perhaps there was little litigation because the
problem was not as egregious as the legal pundits feared. It is
noteworthy that the End Racial Profiling Act of 20012 does not
even mention racial profiling in the airline security context,"
nor was the issue raised in any of the congressional testimony
87 Id. at 470.
88 Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1995), affd, 106 F.3d 415
(11th Cir. 1997). The court stated that "the jury could not reasonably draw any
conclusions, relevant to [the plaintiffs], from the fact that greater than 60% of
stops on existing videotapes were of blacks." Id. at 1544-45.
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
90 Id. at 374.
' The Court noted that "[n]o reason whatever, except the will of the supervi-
sors, is assigned" and that "[n]o reason [for the disparate impact] is shown, and
the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to
the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong." Id. at 374.
92 End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001).
93 The text of the Act focuses mostly on racial profiling by police but does
allude to racial profiling in the United States Customs Service. Id. The defini-
tion of racial profiling is also interesting as it seems to go against the weight of
precedent set in the courts:
The term 'racial profiling' means the practice of a law enforcement
agent relying, to any degree, on race, ethnicity, or national origin
in selecting which individuals to subject to routine investigatory ac-
tivities . . . except that racial profiling does not include reliance on
such criteria in combination with other identifying factors when
the law enforcement agent is seeking to apprehend a specific sus-
pect whose race, ethnicity, or national origin is part of the descrip-
tion of the suspect.
Id. § 501(5). This is the fourth time that such a bill has been introduced, and
this one is likely to meet the same fate as the others. Calcaterra & Mitchell, supra
note 76, at 348.
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regarding the bill.Y4 As might logically be expected, the com-
plaints about disparate treatment were somewhat cyclical, rising
during the Gulf War and when there was notable terrorist activ-
ity, and then quickly tapering off."5 When CAPS was introduced
to replace the existing manual profiling system, the relative level
of complaints also tapered off.96 Interestingly, both the Pan Am
and Abbass suits were filed during the time the manual profiling
system was used. Other factors that likely contributed to a de-
creased perception of disparate treatment were the increased
"use of high-tech explosive detectors, which ... dramatically re-
duced the number of hand searches of baggage and changes in
airline procedures in response to suggestions.""7 Finally, peri-
odic reviews of the profiling procedures consistently found
there was no disparate impact on those of Arab descentYx Ac-
cording to James Zogby, president of the Arab American Insti-
tute, racial profiling in airport security was "virtually eliminated"
until the September 11 attacks.""
III. POST-SEPTEMBER 11 - WHEN PASSENGER
AIRLINERS BECOME WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
IN THE HANDS OF MUSLIM TERRORISTS,
IS RACIAL PROFILING PERMISSIBLE?
"If you were boarding an airplane, wouldn't you want au-
thorities to scrutinize Arab passengers?" 'I0
United States citizens stared in horror at video clips of Arab
terrorists flying two passenger airliners into the World Trade
Center. They saw pictures of the Pentagon in flames as the re-
sult of another Arab terrorist attack using a passenger airliner.
They learned in subsequent days of the heroic acts of passengers
11" See, e.g., Banning Racial Profiling: Hearing on "S. 989, the End Racial Profiling
Act of 2001" Before the Subcomm. on the Consititution, Federalism & Property Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of U.S. Senator
Russ Feingold, chairman of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the
Consititution, Federalism & Property Rights).
95 Higgins, supra note 40, at 51. "The Gulf War, World Trade Center bombing
and Oklahoma City bombing all led to more reports of disparate treatment." Id.
96 Slater Remarks, supra note 8. "As [CAPS] came on line, security-related dis-
crimination complaints dropped rapidly-from 78 complaints in 1997, to 11 last
year and 9 so far this year." Id.
97 Slater Remarks, supra note 8.
'8 Slater Remarks, supra note 8.
99 Brand-Williams, supra note 6.
100 Taylor, supra note 5.
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on yet another airliner which thwarted another planned Arab
terrorist attack. And they heard the news reports about a possi-
ble fifth terrorist attack that may have been foiled when the FAA
grounded all aircraft. The FAA and the airlines were faced with
a huge problem - establishing security procedures that would
help to allay the justified fear of flying in the aftermath of this
tragedy and in the face of continuing threats from the same
Arab organization that was responsible for these terrorist
attacks.
New security procedures were established and the public be-
gan slowly returning to the air. With this return under height-
ened security come reports of alleged racial profiling of
passengers of Arab descent. And the alleged profiling incidents
are no longer confined to selection by CAPS, but include allega-
tions of disparate treatment at security checkpoints, at the gates,
and even after boarding the plane.'' Are those who appear to
be Arab being profiled based solely on their race? The answer
to this question is likely "Yes!", at least in some cases. Is Arab
ethnicity a consideration in who is selected for additional ques-
tioning and searches? Again, the answer is likely "Yes!"1 °2
Is using race as a factor in security procedures necessarily
wrong? Public opinion says "No" and rational arguments have
been made that racial profiling, at least in the short term, is jus-
tified under the circumstances. Will a legal challenge based on
disparate treatment be successful? The legal environment prior
to September 11 was not conducive to success, and recent sig-
I0l See, e.g., Statement of Norman Y Mineta Secretary of the Department of Transporta-
tion Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Oct. 12, 2001, available at http://
www.usccr.gov/pubs/tragedy/imm1012/mineta2.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
In the period between September 11 and the date of his statement, the Depart-
ment of Transportation received seven complaints alleging removal from flights
or denial of permission to board because the persons "are, or were perceived to
be, of Arab, Middle Eastern or South Asian descent and/or Muslim." Id. Three
additional complaints alleged discriminatory treatment at security checkpoints.
Id.
102 See, e.g., Ellingwood & Riccardi, supra note 1. A security guard at the Balti-
more-Washington International Airport admitted that he was looking at passen-
gers who appeared to be Arab more closely. Id. "It's hard and it's harsh, but
that's the reality." Id. Also, a pilot stated in a newspaper interview that some of
his fellow pilots admitted they were checking Out passengers for a "Middle East-
ern kind of look." Id. Even an FAA spokesperson acknowledged that some
screeners may be targeting passengers that appear to be Middle Eastern. Lisa
O'Neill Hill & Phil Pitchford, New Fears Raised on Racial Profiling, THE PRESS-EN-
TERPRISE, Sept. 22, 2001, at A5.
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nals from the Supreme Court indicate that success post-Septem-
ber 11 is even less likely.
A. NEW SECURITY PROCEDURES = RAcIL PROFILING?
"Given the events of [September 11], assumptions underly-
ing aviation security have fundamentally changed."" 3
Before the FAA allowed the resumption of air travel, it man-
dated a number of new, stringent security measures."4" These
procedures include: requiring all passengers checking luggage
to go to the tickets counters; increasing the number of plain-
clothes and uniformed security personnel and other law en-
forcement officers at airports; requiring screeners at the security
checkpoints to use hand-screening devices for continuous ran-
dom checks of passengers; adjusting CAPS profiling parameters;
and increasing random security checks throughout airports.1 5
In addition, passengers and their carry-on luggage are being
screened on continuous basis at the gates prior to boarding the
aircraft.' As a result, all passengers are now experiencing
some heightened security and the number of passengers se-
lected for some level of individual attention has increased. 107
The opportunities for perceived or real disparate treatment
have also increased.
1 13 Aviation Security Measures, Including the Screening of Passengers and Property:
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (Sept. 25, 2001) (state-
ment of Monte R. Belger, Acting Deputy Adrn'r, Fed. Aviation Admin.) [hereinaf-
ter Belger Statement].
104 Id.
105 Id. The security procedures listed are the ones most likely to provide an
opportunity for racial profiling. Other procedures were mandated as well. See id.
As might logically be expected, CAPS parameters are being adjusted as more
information about the attacks is obtained and in the face of new information
regarding potential attacks. The Use of Explosives Detection Technology to Screen
Checked Baggage: Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. &
Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2001) (statement of Steven Zaidman, Assoc.
Adm'r for Research & Acquisitions, Fed. Aviation Admin.) [hereinafter Zaidman
Statement].
106 Zaidman Statement, supra note 105.
1117 Sharon Cohen, Terror Attacks Revive Concerns About Profiling, HoUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 21, 2001, at A19. Paul Takemoto of the FAA acknowledged in an
interview that the number of passengers selected by CAPS and for other random
procedures has increased significantly. Id.
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The allegations of disparate treatment of Arabs in this new
security regime began almost immediately. °8 Pilots who elected
to exercise their right to evict passengers that they viewed as
safety risks exacerbated the situation. 10 9 But it is not at all clear
that disparate treatment is the rule, not the exception."0 The
naturally heightened sensitivity of Arab travelers, combined with
these new subjective and random security procedures, create an
environment that fosters misperceptions. Although certainly
not dispositive, the results of an informal survey conducted by a
newspaper at two major airports in late January are interesting.
Of the more than 1000 passengers observed, only between 5 and
10 percent were selected for extra inspection at the boarding
gates. 1" Of those passengers selected, most were white males
followed by white females. 1' 2 "Although dozens of people who
appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent boarded the flights,
only two received extra screening. ' 1 3
The FAA and the airlines are attempting to be responsive to
the concerns of Arab passengers while firmly standing behind
the new security procedures. In light of what it acknowledged to
be "a rash of improper and insensitive searches and other im-
108 Id. This article contains examples of the types of reported events. Shora, a
male of Syrian descent, was patted down and asked to remove his shoes after
passing through the security checkpoint and observed that no other passenger
around him was selected for such treatment. Id. Bhuiya, a female of Bangladeshi
descent, believed that she was selected because of her dark skin and her Muslim-
style head scarf. Id. Ahmar Massod, an American citizen of Pakastani origin, said
he was the only person asked by for identification by the police was he was in line
at the Boston airport. Id.
109 See, e.g., Stossel, supra note 5; CNN Report, supra note 5; Jonah Goldberg,
Racial Profiling? Maybe, But So What?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 5, 2002, at A13. In
one incident, Ashraf Khan, an American citizen of Pakastani descent, was seated
on a Delta flight in route to his brother's wedding. Stossel, supra note 5. Per Mr.
Khan, the pilot asked him to leave, saying that "Me and my crew make a decision
that we are not secure flying with you." Id. In another reported incident, Vahid
Zhorehvandi, a software developer en route from Seattle to Dallas, was asked to
leave his American Airlines flight. CNN Report, supra note 5. He claims he was
told that the pilot did not "feel comfortable flying." Id. And, in yet another inci-
dent, Walied Shater, a Secret Service agent, was not allowed on his American
Airlines flight because the pilot felt he was a security risk. Goldberg, supra.
110 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 107. Civil rights organizations and some Arab
groups who are monitoring the situation have seen no widespread signs of racial
profiling. Id.
I Bob von Sternberg, Racial Profiling Complaints Climb at Airports; Arab-Ameri-
cans Fear They are Being Singled Out, But the Government and Airlines Say the Increased
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proper treatment of ... Arab-Americans by airport and air car-
rier security personnel," the FAA issued a policy statement,
Carrying Out Transportation Inspection and Safety Responsibilities in a
Nondiscriminatory Manner,' 14 to all those involved in the security
process." 5 This statement admonishes security personnel to be
respectful and sensitive as they carry out their responsibilities." 6
It also states quite bluntly that passengers or their property
should not be subjected to "inspection, search and/or detention
solely because [the passengers] appear to be Arab, Middle East-
ern, Asian, and/or Muslim; or solely because they speak Arabic,
Farsi, or another foreign language; or solely because they speak
with an accent that may lead you to believe they are Arab, Mid-
dle Eastern, Asian, and/or Muslim." '117 The standard personnel
involved in making safety or security determinations are di-
rected to use is what the FAA calls the "but/for" test.' 18 "But for
this person's perceived race, ethnic heritage or religious orienta-
tion, would I have subjected this individual to additional safety
or security scrutiny?"' 19
In the midst of these allegations, reports, and attempts to miti-
gate, the new aviation security act was passed. 2" Amongst its
many provisions are two that may help remove personal subjec-
tivity from the passenger selection process and alleviate percep-
tions of disparity. First, the DOT is permitted to implement
"trusted passenger programs" to expedite the screening of pas-
sengers who have passed some type of yet to be determined
prescreening criteria.' 2' Since the stated goal is to allow screen-
ing personnel to "focus on those passengers who should be sub-
ject to more extensive screening,"122 participants in the program
will presumably be allowed to bypass some or all of the addi-
tional searches. Second, and more significantly, the DOT is in-
structed to expand CAPS "to evaluate all passengers before they
114 Carrying Out Transportation Inspection and Safety Responsibilities in a Nondis-
criminatory Manner, Oct. 12, 2001, available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/
rules/20011012.htm [hereinafter DOT Policy Statement].
115 Sternberg, supra note 111 (quoting from a statement by the FAA).
116 DOT Policy Statement, supra note 114.
117 DOT Policy Statement, supra note 114. However, note the use of the word
"solely" in this statement.
18 DOT Policy Statement, supra note 114.
H" DOT Policy Statement, supra note 114.
12) Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001).
121 Id. §109(a) (3).
122 Id.
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board an aircraft, ' 2" not just those who check luggage. Pro-
vided the system is used at the screening checkpoints as well as
at the airline reservation desks and gates, almost all subjectivity
can be removed. 
4
B. PUBLIC OPINION - A NECESSARY EVIL
"I don't need this kind of irony in my life.' 2
5
After September 11, the American public generally seems to
favor the use of racial profiling to potentially increase the level
of safety of airline travel. 126 This attitude is illustrated in the
results of several polls taken in the days immediately following
the terrorist attacks. 27 Interestingly, one poll shows that African
Americans, the traditional victims of racial profiling, were in
favor racial profiling directed at terrorists.' 28 A poll of the
123 1i. § 136(2).
124 Barry Steinhardt of the ACLU has stated that there is no "evidence of racial
profiling by the FAA to the extent they are relying on the CAPPS system." Co-
hen, supra note 107.
125 Garry Trudeau, Doonesbusy © (Oct. 13, 2001), available at http://www.
doonesbury.com/strip/dailydose/index20011013.hti. This phrase is spoken by
a black man on an airplane after he has "profiled" a passenger of Arab descent as
a potential terrorist.
1261 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 5; Stossel, supra note 5; Sanders, supra note 5;
Murray, supra note 5. To determine how you stand on this issue, try this test
suggested by the Taylor article:
A few weeks hence, or a year hence, you are about to board a cross-
country flight. Glancing around the departure lounge, you notice
lots of white men and women; some black men and women; four
young, casually dressed Latino-looking men; and three young, well-
dressed Arab-looking men. Would your next thought be, "I sure do
hope that the people who let me through security without patting
me down didn't violate Ashcroft's policy by frisking any of those
three guys"? Or more like, "I hope somebody gave those three a
good frisking to make sure they didn't have box cutters"?
Taylor, supra note 5.
127 See, e.g., Brand-Williams, supra note 6; Henry Weinstein, et al., Racial Profil-
ing Gains Sup [ort as Search Tactic, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at Al. The Brand-
Williams article cites both a survey conducted by The Detroit News and a CNN/ USA
Today/Gallup poll. The newspaper survey found that 59% of those surveyed sup-
port "extra precaution in delaying people of Arab descent who are flying."
Brand-Williams, supra. The poll also found that a majority support requiring peo-
ple of Arab descent to "undergo special, more intensive security checks before
boarding airplanes in the U.S." Id. A Los Angeles Times poll found that 68% of
the people questioned approved "randomly stopping people who may fit the pro-
file of suspected terrorists." Weinstein, supra.
12 Clarence Page, Look Who's in Favor of Racial Profiling Now, SEA-1--LE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 2001, at B7. Of the black respondents to a Gallup poll,
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Arabic community conducted by the ADC was also favorable. 129
But this favorable posture is tempered with ambivalence. In
general, the people polled felt racial profiling was a necessary
evil under the post-September 11 circumstances, not something
to be endorsed in general. No rational American wants to treat
the members of the Arabic community as second class citizens.
This ambivalence is perhaps best illustrated by this series of
Doonesbury © cartoons published in early October 2001:
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news/nw/terror2001/polll_20011001.htm. In a poil of Arab Americans con-
ducted by the Detroit Free Press and EPIC/MRA, 61% said extra questioning or
inspections of "people with Middle Eastern features or accents" are justified. Id.
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Doonesbury ©2001 G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permission of
Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
These words sum up why the attitude of the American public
has changed: "Racial profiling seems somehow different after
Sept. 11 ...Our communal sense of security seems to have
changed our view. The consensus seems to be if there is a clear
and present danger, racial profiling can be permissible."' 13
C. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RACIAL PROFILING
While the FAA and the government are putting in place new
security procedures and attempting to show that Arabs are not
being mistreated in the process, they are circling around a very
central issue. All of these changes are designed to catch poten-
tial terrorists. And, these terrorists, at least in face of the current
130 Doonesbury (Oct. 8, 2001) © 2001 G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permission
of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
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threats, tend to be young Arab males. So, why not admit this
fact and permit some limited, judicious use of race and ethnicity
in evaluating the security risk presented by a passenger?
Permitting the consideration of race when administering se-
curity procedures does not mean that all "Arab-looking people
should be stopped, questioned, and searched based solely on
their ethnicity."' 1 Race should be one of the permissible fac-
tors, at least until a foolproof security system is created. 32 Not
to do so borders on irrationality. "We are concerned about peo-
ple from a particular region of the world. They tend to be
young, they tend to be male. And we ought to spend most of
our time looking for them."'33 Instead, in an effort to avoid a
reasonable infringement of the civil liberties of a few, gaping
holes are left that a terrorist could slip through.
Consider the following situation. Apparently two of the Sep-
tember 11 hijackers were flagged by CAPS because they had,
among other things, reserved their tickets using a credit card
but paid in cash.' 4 Presumably, their checked luggage was
screened as this was what was supposed to happen but neither of
them was searched or questioned, probably due to Arab sensitiv-
ity about profiling.3 5 Arguably, if ethnicity or national origin
had been part of the criteria, all of the hijackers might have
been selected.'3 If questioning and personal searches had been
routine, perhaps a pattern would have been detected. 13 7 Per-
haps American sensitivity about racial profiling actually simpli-
fied the hijackers' job. 38
Allowing the use of race in the air travel security context is not
the same as condoning the use of racial profiling in other law
'31 Doonesbury (Oct. 9, 2001) © 2001 G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permission
of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
132 Doonesbuiy (Oct. 10, 2001) © 2001 G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permis-
sion of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
33 Doonesbuiy (Oct. 11, 2001) © 2001 G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permis-
sion of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
134 Doonesbury (Oct. 12, 2001) @ 2001 G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permis-
sion of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
135 Doonesbury (Oct. 13, 2001) © 2001 G.B. Trudeai. Reprinted with permis-
sion of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
I' Amer G. Zahr, I Guess I Fit the Profile, MICHI GAN DAILY (U. Michigan), Jan.
14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8293136 (quoting Pete DtIPont of the National
Center for Policy Analysis).
1.7 Taylor, supra note 5.
'-31 Taylor, supra note 5.
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enforcement situations.139 Preventing another "mass-murder-su-
icide hijacking" is considerably different from, and more impor-
tant than, catching drug dealers or other criminals. 140 The
stakes are much higher and the circumstances are much
different.
Such profiling is not necessarily illegal discrimination. Under
these circumstances, the profiling is in response to a "specific
threat to commit a specific crime (more suicide hijackings)
made by a specific group (the Islamic terrorists of al-Qaeda) ."14
This type of profiling has been endorsed in federal court. 142
D. THE LEGAL CLIMATE
"Historically, the Supreme Court does not have a great re-
cord for protecting individual rights during times like
these.""14
As previously discussed, the probability of success of a racial
profiling claim in air travel security procedures was low prior to
September 11. Now, this probability is virtually nonexistent. If
the FAA were to allow the open use of race or ethnicity in com-
bination with other factors, rational arguments can be made,
supported by Supreme Court precedent, that the FAA has a
compelling interest in preventing future terrorist attacks, and
using race or ethnicity is sufficiently narrowly tailored to support
that interest. The Supreme Court has permitted the considera-
tion of race in circumstances far less threatening than those fac-
ing the FAA. 144 To paraphrase the Court, "even if it be assumed
that such [selections for heightened security procedures] are
made largely on the basis of apparent [Arab] ancestry, we per-
ceive no constitutional violation."' 14 5 "The likelihood that any
given person of [Arab] ancestry is a terrorist is high enough to
139 Koch, supra note 29. The article is quoting Neil Livingstone, the chairman
and CEO of GlobalOptions who is a security expert. Id.
1 Richard Lowry, Profiles in Cowardice: How to Deal with the Terrorist Threat - and
How Not To, NAT'L REV., Jan. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 11777148.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. This has apparently happened in other countries. In 1986, a pregnant
woman flying from Heathrow to Tel Aviv was pulled aside because pregnant wo-
men don't usually travel alone. Id. It was subsequently discovered that a bomb
had been planted in her carry-on bag by herJordanian boyfriend. Id.
144 Id.
145 Taylor, supra note 5.
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make [Arab] appearance a relevant factor."'14 6 Clearly, these
same precedents would apply if the status quo is maintained and
a claim is made that the security personnel are making subjec-
tive selections based on race.
In addition, the Supreme Court's response to two recent cases
may be indicative of how future racial profiling cases will fare in
the courts.
On Oct. 1, 2001, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiori
to what is viewed to be an important racial profiling case, Brown
v. City of Oneonta.147 In this case, the black residents of the city
of Oneonta sued various law enforcement agencies after officers
interrogated almost all of the black males in the city.'48 The
officers were looking for a suspect who had been described as a
black male with a cut on his arm.'49 The Second Circuit found
that even though the police were selecting people for interroga-
tion based primarily on race and gender, "they could act on the
basis of that description without violating the Equal Protection
Clause" provided there was no evidence of discriminatory racial
animus.5 " The court recognized that "question[ing] every per-
son fitting a general description-may well have a disparate im-
pact on small minority groups" but that a disparate impact was
permissible under the circumstances. 151 The court's rationale is
particularly interesting in view the current air travel security
procedures:
If there are few black residents who fit the general description,
for example, it would be more useful for the police to use race to
find a black suspect than a white one. It may also be practicable
for law enforcement to attempt to contact every black person
who was a young male, but quite impossible to contact every such
white person. If a community were primarily black with very few
white residents and the search were for a young white male, the
impact would be reversed. 15 2
lb Taylor, supra note 5.
147 Lowry, supra note 142.
148 Lowry, supra note 142; see the discussion of the Brown case in the next
section.
'49 Mark Curriden, High Court Case May Gauge Civil Rights in Post-Attack Era,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 27, 2001, at 7A (quoting Thomas Baker, a law pro-
fessor and specialist in Supreme Court matters).
150 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
151 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 564 n.17.
152 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
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The analogy to searching for potential Arab terrorists among
airline passengers who are predominately non-Arab is quite ob-
vious. If a disparate impact did not trigger the Equal Protection
clause in police procedures in searching for a mugger, how
could it possibly do so in air travel security procedures attempt-
ing to prevent murder and mass destruction?
The refusal of the Supreme Court to hear Brown was a major
blow to Arab civil rights leaders.I53 They recognize that this rul-
ing is very detrimental to their ongoing efforts to stop profiling
of Arabs as potential terrorists. 154 Per one leader, the ruling
"sends a wrong message" and "the fight is only getting
harder."155
The Supreme Court recently considered U.S. v. Arvizu, 516 a
case that legal experts believed would "tell us if the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights is the same document it was [before Sep-
tember 11]." 15 1 Prior to September 11, Victoria Brambl, a law-
yer representing Mr. Arvizu, thought that a victory was a strong
possibility. 5 1 Post September 11, she was worried that the at-
tacks would "make it easier for the court to loosen the reigns on
law enforcement."' 5  She was right to worry. The Supreme
Court overturned the lower court decision that favored her
client.
While Arvizu does not deal specifically with the issue of racial
profiling, the comments of Justice O'Connor during oral argu-
ments make it interesting in this context. O'Connor said, "We
live in perhaps a more dangerous age today. Are we really going
to back off the totality-of-the-circumstances standard?16" [The
9th Circuit ruling] seems a little more rigid than common sense
153 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
816 (2001).
154 Robert J. Sievert, Meeting the Twenty-First Centuy Terrorist Threat Within the
Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1421, 1455 (citing
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111,116 (2d Cir. 1999)).
155 Sievert, supra note 156, at 1455.
156 Brown, 221 F.3d at 333-34.
157 Id. at 338.
158 Id. "Defendants' policy was race-neutral on its face; their policy was to in-
vestigate crimes by interviewing the victim, getting a description of the assailant,
and seeking out persons who matched that description .... Id. at 337. "In acting
on . . . a description that included race as one of several elements-defendants
did not engage in a suspect racial classification that would draw strict scrutiny."
Id. at 337-38.
159 Brand-Williams, supra note 6.
160 Brand-Williams, supra note 6.
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would dictate."16 This statement, together with a previous
speech in which Justice O'Connor said that "some civil liberties
might have to yield to the needs of security," seems to indicate
howJustice O'Connor would vote in a racial profiling case.
16 2
There are some other, more subtle indicators that racial pro-
filing of Arabs might be legally permissible. The Justice Depart-
ment was supposed to release a "comprehensive review of racial
profiling" in October of 2001.1 That report is now on indefi-
nite hold with its resources devoted to the new war on terror-
ism."4 And government spokespersons seem to be
equivocating. In a September 16 interview, John Ashcroft indi-
cated that people are not "suspects based solely on their race or
ethnic origin. '"165 FBI Director Robert Mueller, in an interview
the next day, said: "We do not, have not, will not target people
based solely on their ethnicity. Period."'166 The DOT, in its direc-
tive intended to instruct people involved in the security process
in administering it in a nondiscriminatory fashion, made liberal
use of the word solely when describing prohibited factors. 67 Is
there some implicit recognition here that race may be consid-
ered as long as it is not the only consideration?
Despite this legal climate that gives lawsuits alleging racial
profiling of Arabs little chance of succeeding, the first suit has
been filed. The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois filed
a lawsuit in federal district court on January 16, 2002, on behalf
of Sumar Kaukab, a United States citizen of Pakastani de-
scent. '6 Ms. Kaukab was allegedly subjected to "repeated and
increasingly invasive searches" by security personnel at O'Hare
International Airport. 6 v1  According to an ACLU lawyer,
"[s]ecurity personnel surrounded her, detained her and sub-
16, Brand-Williams, supra note 6.
162 United States v. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002), rev 232 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir.
2000).
113 Curriden, supra note 149, at 1A (quoting University of Georgia law profes-
sor Eugene Wilkes).
164 Curriden, supra note 149, at 7A.
165 Curriden, supra note 149, at 7A.
166 The totality-of-circumstances standard permits a law enforcement officer to
"draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them" to establish
the requisite reasonable suspicion to apprehend someone. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at
750.
167 Tony Mauro, Court Weighs in on Stops at the Border, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 3,
2001, at 8.
168 Id.
169 Evans, supra note 5.
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jected her to an embarrassing and degrading search simply
based on her ethnicity and religion."''" The suit alleges that this
search "violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of freedom
of religion, freedom from unlawful ethnic and religious discrim-
ination and protection against unreasonable search and
seizure."' 71 It will be interesting to see if the case makes it much
beyond this filing stage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Monte Belger, Acting Deputy Administrator of the FAA, gave
a very accurate summary of the challenges in air travel security
in the wake of the terrorist attacks:
The nature of the threat facing America has changed. What we
faced on September 11 th was a new phenomenon-hijackers tak-
ing over commercial flights for the sole purpose of turning them
into human-guided terrorist bombs of massive explosive power.
Given the events of [September 11th], assumptions underlying
aviation security have fundamentally changed. 7 2
If the assumptions have fundamentally changed, perhaps it is
time to make some fundamental changes. The use of race or
ethnicity as a factor in deciding who should be subjected to en-
hanced security procedures should be openly permitted. This is
not to say that every passenger who is, or appears to be, of Arab
descent should automatically be subjected to those procedures.
Rather, it is one factor that should be weighed, perhaps quite
heavily, in the overall consideration. The weight of this factor
can be altered if and when other security procedures, or the
elimination of the threat, make it unnecessary.
Concern has been expressed that if we allow the events of Sep-
tember 11th to weaken our constitutional rights, the terrorists
will have won some sort of moral victory. 173 But allowing a lim-
ited use of race in profiling terrorists for airport security pur-
poses does not weaken our constitutional rights. The authors of
the Bill of Rights did intend to provide for the equal treatment
of all people under the laws of the United States when they
wrote these words:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
170 Evans, supra note 5.
171 Taylor, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
172 Taylor, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
173 DOT Policy Statement, supra note 114.
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any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.' 7 4
Our legal system should, and does, protect these rights except
in extraordinary circumstances. The destruction of the World
Trade Center, the attack on the Pentagon, and the continuing,
very real threat of more terrorist attacks create such extraordi-
nary circumstances.
Our legal system, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause,
has found that a disparate impact based on race is permissible
(and hence constitutional). The test for this permissibility is
that there is a compelling governmental purpose, that whatever
is causing the disparate impact is narrowly tailored to fulfill that
purpose, and that the disparate impact is not motivated by racial
animus. The use of race in this context is not based on racial
hatred, but on a very real need to provide increased security in
the face of a threat that is coming from an organization whose
members are mostly of Arab descent. As one legal commentator
so aptly phrased it:
In constitutional-law parlance, while racial profiling may be pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, that presumption is overcome in the
case of airline passengers, because the government has a compel-
ling interest in preventing mass-murder-suicide hijackings, and
because close scrutiny of Arab-looking people is narrowly tai-
lored to protect that interest.' v
Those who think this threat is not enough to justify the ex-
treme measure of some disparate treatment of those of Arab de-
scent to help ensure the safety of all United States citizens when
they choose to fly (or, as the events of September 11 so tragically
demonstrated, even as they go about their normal lives) should
ponder the words of Osama Bin Laden in an ABC news inter-
view in 1998: "They are all targets . . . every day . . . they will
receive a new corpse . . ." "We do not differentiate between
those dressed in military uniforms and civilians."'17 7 They should
174 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Illinois Challenges
Ethnic and Religious Bias in Strip Search of Muslim Woman at O'Hare Interna-




177 American Muslim Woman Files Suit Over Search at O'Hare, CNN.com (Jan. 17,
2002), http://www.cnn.com/2OO2/LAW/O1 /I 7/airport.search.lawsuit/index.
html.
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consider the known al Qaeda members that are still out there,
looking for an opportunity to strike again. 78 As Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft so succinctly stated, there is "a clear, unmis-
takable threat that al-Qaeda could attack the United States
"1179again.
178 Belger Statement, supra note 103.
179 See, e.g., Curriden, supra note 149, at 7A; Jarvis C. Jones, Pitfalls of Ethnic
Profiling, 58-OCT BENCH & B. MINN. 5 (2001).
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